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EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
The George Washington University
David J. Berteau
President & CEO
The Professional Services Council
I. A TIME OF CHANGE: AN UNCERTAIN (BUT CERTAINLY ACTIVE) FUTURE
A. The Pending Regulatory Flurry? Five years ago, in our 2017 materials, we highlighted that
Michael Fischetti (then NCMA’s Executive Director) described the first full year of the prior administration
as “the longest time between a new administration taking office and publishing changes to procurement
rules since the adoption of the [Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), on April Fool’s Day, 1984].” Looking
ahead, it appears that the languid pace of FAR activity is due for a change.
As if signaling the start of a race, and although little changed substantively, the housekeeping rule
changes that implemented the bifurcation of “commercial items” into “commercial products” and “commercial
services” sprinkled revisions throughout the FAR. See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. 61017 (Nov. 4, 2021) (implementing
2019 NDAA § 836); FAR Final Rule Bifurcates “Commercial Item” Definition, 63 GC ¶ 337(b); 86 Fed. Reg.
68441 (Dec. 2, 2021); GSAR Final Rule Implements FAR Commercial Item Split, 63 GC ¶ 364; see also Vernon
J. Edwards, Commercial Items: Confusion In Court, 35 N&CR ¶ 72 (December 2021) (“If the lawyers and
judges … were confused about commercial items and services, it is no wonder. The term commercial items
was misleading for more than 20 years, and the former definition of commercial items in FAR 2.101 was
awful.”). Our generation’s librarians and administrative staff paused for moment to contemplate the amount
of effort they were spared by the current online official FAR. (More on that, below.) Go ahead, just imagine
exactly how many pages of the office’s loose-leaf paper version of the FAR would have required replacement.
As 2022 begins, the FAR Council confronts an ambitious agenda (Semiannual Regulatory Agenda,
87 Fed. Reg. 5312 (January 31, 2022)), responding to legislative mandates and Executive Orders, and attempting to promulgate rules related to, among other things:
•

COVID-related safety measures, which, of course, remain hotly disputed and subject to pending
litigation. See, generally, See, generally, District Courts Enjoin Contractor Vaccine Mandate, 63
GC ¶ 368; White House Delays Contractor Vaccine Deadline, 63 GC ¶ 357(a); States Sue Over
Contractor Vaccine Mandate, 63 GC ¶ 346; Scott A. Schipma, Michael J. Schaengold, & Aaron M.
Levin, Feature Comment, A Federal Contractor’s Guide To The Evolving COVID-19 Safeguard
Requirements, 63 GC ¶ 308; White House Task Force Issues Guidance On Covid Protocols, Vaccine
Mandates, 63 GC ¶ 290; 86 Fed. Reg. 50985 (Sep. 14, 2021); EO Requires Federal Contractors
to Follow Covid Safety Protocols—President Biden September 9 issued Executive Order 14042,
63 GC ¶ 276(a). The uncertainties associated with the mandates and the litigation challenging
them continue to generate unanticipated issues, concerns, and inefficiencies.
•

See also, generally, DoD IG, Audit of the DoD Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act Awards to the Defense Industrial Base, (May 20, 2021) (finding compliance with criteria in
awarding contracts with regard to Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
funding), https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/24/2002724461/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2021-081.PDF;
CARES Act Contracts Properly Awarded, DOD IG Finds, 63 GC ¶ 171; GAO-21-475, Contractor
Paid Leave Reimbursements Could Provide Lessons Learned for Future Emergency Responses,
(July 2021) (indicating that the government had not yet, but “could seize an opportunity to
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enhance implementation of paid leave reimbursement provisions that may be enacted as part of rapid federal responses to
future emergencies”), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-475;
GAO Reviews How Agencies, Contractors Used CARES Act Reimbursement Authority, 63 GC ¶ 227; Anna Jean Wirth, Sydney
Litterer, Elvira N. Loredo, Laura H. Baldwin, Ricardo Sanchez,
Keeping the Defense Industrial Base Afloat During COVID-19:
A Review of Department of Defense and Federal Government
Policies and Investments in the Defense Industrial Base (RAND,
2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1392-1.
html.
•

© 2022 Thomson Reuters

As the pandemic continues, we wonder how future generations
will compare the current experience to the 1918 Flu Epidemic.
Obviously, the nation is far more populous today, but the level
of loss remains staggering. As 2022 begins, more than 900,000
coronavirus-related deaths have been reported in the United
States.

•

Increasing the Buy American Act’s domestic content threshold,
creating new price preferences for critical products, etc., (EO 14005,
86 Fed. Reg. 7475, January 28, 2021; and 86 Fed. Reg. 40980, July
30, 2021); Industry Criticizes Proposed FAR Buy American Overhaul, 63 GC ¶ 336; Biden Administration Moves To Boost Domestic
Purchasing Requirements, 63 GC ¶ 25;

•

Minimum wages ($15 per hour) for contractor personnel (implementing EO 14026, 86 Fed. Reg. 22835, April 27, 2021, and 86 Fed. Reg.
67126, November 24, 2021, see also the Department of Labor’s resource page, Increasing the Minimum Wage for Federal Contractors,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/government-contracts/eo14026);

•

Climate change, sustainable procurement, and the social costs of
greenhouse gasses (apparently, the public (including this chapter’s
authors) submitted more than 35,000 comments in response to
the Fall 2021 notice of proposed rulemaking, although a cursory
review suggests that many of those comments reflected, in effect,
a letter-writing campaign);
•

See also, EO 14057, Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and
Jobs Through Federal Sustainability, 86 Fed. Reg. 70935 (December 8, 2021) (calling for agencies to reduce (scope 1, 2, and
3) greenhouse gas emissions, achieving net-zero emissions in
buildings transition to carbon pollution-free electricity and a
zero-emission fleet); EO Addresses Emissions, Promotes Clean
Energy, 64 GC ¶ 371. Section 208 specifically addresses sustainable acquisition and procurement, mandating, among other
things, use of full lifecycle cost methodologies (to acknowledge
externalities or environmental effects) and purchasing sustainable products and services identified and recommended by
EPA. Two particularly challenging tasks include (Section 401)
engaging, educating, and training the workforce, and (Section
402) incorporating environmental justice;

•

See also Agencies Plan For Climate Change Risks To Supply
Chains, Procurement, 63 GC ¶ 309 (initial, now annual climate action plans, with a focus on adaptation to, as opposed
to mitigation of, climate change); and

320

NOTES
•

For additional discussion of these issues, see Steven L. Schooner & Evan Matsuda, Sustainable Procurement: Building Vocabulary to Accelerate the Federal Procurement Conversation,
21-10 Briefing Papers 1 (September 2021); National Contract
Management Association’s (NCMA’s) Climate & Sustainable
Procurement Knowledge Center, https://www.ncmahq.org/
climate.

•

Cybersecurity issues, including the Cybersecurity Maturity Model
Certification (CMMC), see also DoD’s CMMC 2.0 resource at
https://www.acq.osd.mil/cmmc/, including the streamlined Briefing
Overview (December 3, 2021) (referencing a “[t]imeline to complete
all rulemaking requirements [that] will be 9 to 24 months”), https://
www.acq.osd.mil/cmmc/docs/CMMC-2.0-Overview-2021-12-03.pdf;
Alex Major & Franklin Turner, Feature Comment: Get Back: DOD
Retreats While Revealing Plans For CMMC 2.0, 63 GC ¶ 359 (“The
revised standards … are a significant change from the initial set
of standards that evolved over the past three and a half years.”);
DOD Overhauls CMMC Cybersecurity Certification Framework,
63 GC ¶ 352.

•

Section 889’s prohibitions with regard to certain technology goods
and services provided by various Chinese firms (multiple rules);
see generally, FAR Subpart 4.21, implementing section 889 of the
2019 NDAA;

•

Small business size status representation (and recertification)
with regard to affiliations (including the mentor-protégé’ program, joint ventures, etc.,) and SBA’s Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR)
Policy Directives (85 Fed. Reg. 66146, October 16, 2020, etc.),
and accelerated payment dates for small business contractors
and subcontractors. See also, with regard to limitations on small
business subcontracting, 86 Fed. Reg. 44,234 (August 11, 2021);
Franklin Turner, Alex Major, Cara Wulf, & Ethan Brown, Feature
Comment: Bueller … Bueller … Bueller: The FAR Council’s Day(s)
Off Come To An End With The Long-Awaited Implementation Of
The SBA’s 2016 Revisions To The Limitations On Subcontracting
Rule, 63 GC ¶ 263;

•

Further tweaking of commercial purchasing policies, including
efforts to reduce the regulatory burdens associated with contracts
for commercial products, commercial services, and commercially
available off-the-shelf (COTS) items contracts, and clarification of
the definition of “subcontractor”; see generally FAR Part 12; and

•

Disclosure mandates with regard to beneficial ownership of corporations (FAR Case 2021-2021-005); disclosures with regard
to political contributions (FAR Case 2021-006); explanations to
unsuccessful offerors on certain orders under task and delivery
order contracts (FAR Case 2020-005), etc.

B. Transitioning From Policy to Implementation: A Daunting
Hill To Climb. To be clear, our intent here is to highlight the scope of activity or describe the trajectory or trend, rather than provide a comprehensive
list. For example, it is premature to predict whether the FAR Council will
undertake rulemaking to ensure that “Government contracting and procurement opportunities should be available on an equal basis to all eligible
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providers of goods and services … [and remove] any barriers to full and
equal participation in agency procurement and contracting[,]” pursuant
to EO 13985, Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (January
20, 2021) (among other things, revoking 13950, Combating Race and Sex
Stereotyping, 85 Fed. Reg. 60683 (September 22, 2020)); OMB Memo M-2117, Revocation of Executive Order 13950, M-20-37, and M-20-34 (March 2,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/M-21-17.
pdf; President Issues EOs On Contract Prisons, Racial Equity, Climate
Change, Pandemic Supplies, 63 GC ¶ 30; OMB Rescinds Memos Implementing Revoked Anti-Diversity Training EO, 63 GC ¶ 71. Of course, the
challenge in every administration – and with regard to change, generally,
lies in transitioning from policy to practice. Only time will tell if the FAR
Council can keep pace with its ambitious schedule and, of course, how
effectively agencies and contractors can implement the more significant
changes.
II. PROCUREMENT (AND GRANT) SPENDING & SPEND DATA
A. Show Me the (Infrastructure) Money! We assume we’re not
alone in not holding our breath to see how the widely touted $1.2 trillion
in long overdue funds flowing from the Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act (“Infrastructure Act”), Pub. L. No. 117–58, will impact the federal
procurement marketplace. Surely, our community and marketplace will be
reshaped by such a massive investment in roads, bridges, rail, broadband,
power and grid, water (and ports), public transit, resiliency initiatives,
school busses and ferries, electrical vehicle charging, etc. Alas, to the extent
that it does, it will do so only indirectly. As our readers understand, the
lion’s share of this money will be dispersed (primarily to the states) through
grants, and little will translate directly into federal procurement contracts.
See https://www.whitehouse.gov/build/ and Building A Better America: A
Guidebook to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for State, Local, Tribal, and
Territorial Governments, and Other Partners (a 456-page “roadmap to the
funding available under the law”), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/01/BUILDING-A-BETTER-AMERICA_FINAL.pdf. For a
broad perspective, see, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, Understanding
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, (January 13, 2022), https://
www.cfr.org/event/understanding-infrastructure-investment-and-jobs-act.
Still, last year, as noted below, grants again dramatically exceeded procurement spending, as they’ve done for eighteen of the last twenty years.
(Procurement dollars last exceeded grant spending in 2008.) Having said
that, the gap appears to be widening and, over the next decade, the trendlines may diverge far more dramatically. However, actual appropriations
for these initiatives have not yet been enacted, and the possibility of more
Continuing Resolutions (CR’s) adds delay, further muddying the waters.
B. Whither The Budgeting Enterprise. On a positive note, the Federal
Government did not shut down in 2021 as a result of Congress’ unwillingness to deal with budgets consistent with the pre-existing scheme for doing
so. Conversely, it’s difficult to call the current process, heavily dependent
upon continuing resolutions (CR) a meaningful budget process. We are not
optimistic that, in the current, hyper-partisan environment, this process will
quickly sort itself out. As one of us (OK, David) remarked (after noting that
we’ve begun the fiscal year under a CR in eleven of the last twelve years),
this is not the way to run the federal government. See, generally, Congress
© 2022 Thomson Reuters
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Avoids Shutdown, Industry Group Supports Bill To End Shutdown Risk, 63
GC ¶ 294. And stay tuned for developments in early 2022.
C. Peak, Blip, Plateau, Trend? In last year’s chapter, the big news
was that Federal procurement spending exceeded $600 billion for FY2020.
(Again, wow!) Moreover, the peak – $668 billion – ultimately exceeded the
estimate we tentatively reported (last year). In 2021, although federal procurement spending dipped below $600 billion, it remained one of the highest
totals, ever. All of which is dwarfed by the continued growth, nay, expansion
of grant spending.
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending FY2001-2021*
(In Billions of Dollars)
Fiscal
Year

Procurement
Spending

Grant
Spending

Procurement & Grant
Spending (Combined)

2021

$578.6

$1,363.5

$1,942.1

2020

$668.4

$971.3

$1,639.6

2019

$590.2

$765.1

$1,355.3

2018

$555.5

$756.3

$1,311.8

2017

$510.6

$719.2

$1,229.8

2016

$475.5

$671.2

$1,146.6

2015

$439.8

$619.7

$1,059.5

2014

$446.2

$601.2

$1,047.4

2013

$463.4

$525.0

$988.4

2012

$520.8

$542.1

$1,063.0

2011

$539.8

$570.2

$1,110.0

2010

$561.0

$624.4

$1,185.4

2009

$540.6

$671.6

$1,212.2

2008

$541.6

$391.4

$933.1

2007

$469.3

$430.2

$899.5

2006

$430.5

$490.0

$920.5

2005

$391.2

$441.7

$832.9

2004

$346.1

$450.1

$796.2

2003

$318.0

$493.7

$811.7

2002

$264.1

$406.3

$670.4

2001

$223.0

$330.8

$553.8

* FY 2021 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting. The amounts
reported above, for 2019-2020, were adjusted from data previously published in USASpending.gov. Updated data is courtesy of the market intelligence gurus, Amber Hart and
Lisa Shea Mundt, at The Pulse, https://thepulsegovcon.com.
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D. A Step Back for Other Transactions? In last year’s materials,
we highlighted that, consistent with increased popularity, attention, and
emphasis, reliance on other transactions (OT’s) appeared to be increasing
rather dramatically. Although FY20 represented a peak, with $16.5 billion
in OT’s, that still was not statistically significant in the landscape of total
federal discretionary spending. With OT spending slightly down from FY20
to $13.7 billion in FY21, we now have a three-year average of OT spending in
the two-to-three percent range. (Yes, that suggests growth, but it’s still not
that much in total.) Importantly, however, it was not feasible to separate OT
spending for COVID-19 from other purposes, making it harder to predict real
trends in OT usage. See also, GAO-21-501, COVID-19 Contracting: Actions
Needed to Enhance Transparency and Oversight of Selected Awards, www.gao.
gov/assets/gao-21-501.pdf; Pandemic-Related OTA Awards Need Enhanced
Transparency, GAO Finds, 63 GC ¶ 237.

© 2022 Thomson Reuters
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E. Some Observations on Defense Spending. Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and with the nation’s focus turning to domestic
infrastructure (more on that below), could we have seen the peak of defense
procurement spending? If so, there’s a long way down from the recent, lofty
peaks. See also Won Joon Jang, Gregory Sanders & Alexander Holderness,
2021 Defense Acquisition Trends: Topline DoD Trends after a Half Decade
of Growth (CSIS, December 2, 2021) (“Defense contract obligations grew to
$421.3 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2020, a dramatic 41 percent increase since
Department of Defense (DoD) contract spending bottomed out in FY 2015
due to budget caps and reduced overseas deployments.”), https://www.csis.
org/analysis/2021-defense-acquisition-trends-topline-dod-trends-after-halfdecade-growth. Looking ahead, the CSIS report suggests that:
FY 2020 may prove to be a peak year for defense contract
obligations.... [K]ey questions to ask going forward:
Will the high rate of spending on products be sustained,
or will the new administration’s concerns about legacy
platforms change buying patterns?
Will the Air Force and Navy follow in the Army’s footsteps
by increasing use of OTA contracts?
Will the Biden-Harris administration’s skepticism
regarding defense consolidation translate into changes to
vendor size, count, and competition?
And, in a time of renewed attention to supply chains and
a consolidating industrial base, what will be the role for
commercial industry and allied industrial bases?

For broader context, DoD reported that, for FY 2020, its “contract obligations and payroll spending” represented approximately $1,803 per U.S.
resident. (Nope, that’s not a typo.) See Defense Spending By State, Fiscal Year
2020, https://oldcc.gov/dsbs-fy2020; DOD Surveys FY 2020 Top Contractors
And States, 63 GC ¶ 325. Some other interesting data that caught our eyes,
also from the DoD State-By-State survey:
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Defense Spending (By State)
State
Billions
Texas
$83.0
Virginia
$64.3
California
$61.0
Maryland
$30.4
Florida
$29.1
Connecticut
$23.6
Arizona
$20.2
Massachusetts
$18.6
Pennsylvania
$17.8
$15.8
Georgia

To clarify, these figures included both prime- and sub-award contract data
(which, of course suggests the potential for some double counting), but also
included defense personnel and payroll figures.
•

Those ten states accounted for more than 62 percent of total defense spending; and

•

Virginia was the only state in which defense spending accounted
for more than ten percent of GDP (at 11.3 percent).
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Not surprisingly, the figures are similar (but lower) with regard to contracting dollars.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Defense Contracting (By State)
State
Billions
Texas
$71.2
Virginia
$44.8
California
$44.0
Connecticut
$22.8
Maryland
$22.4
Florida
$21.0
Arizona
$17.9
Massachusetts
$17.4
Pennsylvania
$14.8
$13.3
Missouri

As for the leading contractors, there were few surprises, with the top ten
including: Lockheed Martin, General Dynamic, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop
Grumman, L3 Harris Technologies, Huntington Ingalls, BAE Systems, United
Technologies, and Humana.
F. An Attractive (Macro) Picture for Small Business. In July, the
Small Business Administration (SBA) announced a record fiscal year haul
of $145.7 billion in prime contracts (and $82.8 billion in subcontracts) for
small businesses. Although the percentage of dollars (26.01 percent) was
slightly lower than in FY19 (26.5 percent), the total dollar figure represented
a significant increase over reported prime contract awards in FY19 ($132.9
billion), FY18 ($120.8 billion), FY17 ($105 billion), and FY16 ($99.7 billion),
and – for small businesses – continues an encouraging trendline. Although
SBA celebrated the total numbers and percentages, SBA conceded that concentration had occurred, with a decrease in the total number of small businesses receiving prime contracts. Part of this is because increased awards
push many small businesses above the dollar thresholds, effectively punishing growth. Moreover, it may be hard for the administration to increase
small business contract spending in every set-aside category. For example,
while the government “exceeded the service-disabled veteran-owned small
business and small disadvantaged business” goals, it “fell short of meeting
the goals … for women-owned small businesses and HUBZone small businesses.” SBA Release 21-59, Federal Government Awards Record-Breaking
$145.7 Billion in Contracting to Small Businesses, (July 28, 2021), https://
www.sba.gov/article/2021/jul/28/federal-government-awards-record-breaking1457-billion-contracting-small-businesses and https://www.sba.gov/sites/
default/files/2021-01/FY21%20Final%20Goals%20Spreadsheet_508.pdf; see
also Government Surpasses Small Business Contracting Goal In FY 2020,
63 GC ¶ 236.
G. As For Access to the Raw Data…. The evolution of the General
Services Administration’s (GSA’s) Integrated Award Environment (IAE), including the System of Award Management (SAM) and its subsidiary functions,
including the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), continues to evolve.
See, generally, https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/organization/federal-acquisitionservice/office-of-systems-management/integrated-award-environment-iae;
GSA, SAM.gov Update, (“Integrating beta.SAM.gov and SAM.gov on May
24th was certainly the biggest change we made this year, but did you know
we’ve continued to deliver incremental improvements over the past few
© 2022 Thomson Reuters
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months?”), https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/organization/federal-acquisitionservice/office-of-systems-management/integrated-award-environment-iae/
iae-systems-information-kit/samgov-update. We continue to bemoan that
these changes are not sufficiently user-based or user-driven, and we’ve heard
more frustration than satisfaction from experts willing to serve as beta testers. On that note, we encourage you consider trying it yourself. Register to
be a tester on SAM.gov!, https://www.eventbrite.com/e/samgov-tester-sign-uptickets-162431622355.
H. Slicing and Dicing the Data. Interesting as the raw data may be,
we remain skeptical of the utility of measuring and focusing (too much) on
Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT). We are beginning to
see agencies attempt to collect and discuss PALT data, and we look forward
to hearing lessons learned and best practices from agencies who have leveraged this (yet to be) concatenated data from information to policy or practice
or customer service improvements or enhancements. See, generally, Section
878 of the NDAA for 2019, 85 Fed. Reg. 3428 (January 21, 2020); OFPP
Memorandum, Reducing Procurement Administrative Lead Time Using
Modern Business Practices (January 14, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OFPPPALTMemorandum-01-14-2021.pdf; see
also Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) 204.70 and DoD’s Procurement Toolbox, https://dodprocurementtoolbox.com/site-pages/palt. Similarly,
one wonders when transactional data will run its course. See, e.g., GSA
OIG, GSA’s Transactional Data Reporting Pilot Is Not Used to Affect Pricing
Decisions, (June 24, 2021), https://www.gsaig.gov/content/gsas-transactionaldata-reporting-pilot-not-used-affect-pricing-decisions; MAS Transactional
Data Reporting Pilot Has Not Met Goals, GSA IG Finds, 63 GC ¶ 205; Ralph
C. Nash, Transactional Data Reporting: A Lost Cause?, 35 N&CR ¶ 44 (August
2021) (“this seems to be one of those bright ideas that has failed in the implementation process”). Also, we remain on the lookout for (not just numbers
but) meaningful data related to DoD’s reliance on Lowest Price Technically
Acceptable (LPTA) competitions. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service,
Defense Primer: Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Contracts (Updated, December 15, 2021) (Congress has expressed concern regarding the misuse of
LPTA for source selection and has been “concerned that an overarching bias
towards reducing prices paid by [DOD] to the exclusion of other factors could
result in DOD buying low cost products that have the potential to negatively
impact the safety of U.S. military personnel.”) referencing Section 806 of the
FY2020 NDAA and collection of LPTA data in the FPDS, https://sgp.fas.org/
crs/natsec/IF10968.pdf; see also, 86 Fed. Reg. 3679 (January 14, 2021).
III. IT’S STILL ALL ABOUT PEOPLE
A. The Acquisition Workforce. As always, we fret over the staffing,
development, funding, and appreciation of the acquisition workforce. Big
changes are afoot with regard to longstanding regime created by the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). See, Empowering the
Workforce: Back to Basics, https://www.dau.edu/back-to-basics. DoD is
modernizing its implementation of the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) to a 21st Century talent
management framework. The initiative significantly streamlines
the certification construct and re-focuses training resources....
For more than thirty years, training was a one-size-fits-all approach
and delivered early in an individual’s career. Now, DoD is rethinking
training to foster a culture of lifelong learning for current and
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future acquisition professionals….
The Back-to-Basics initiative streamlines career fields into
functional areas, compresses a three-level certification model into
a one- or two-tier framework, and moves away from a front-loaded
training model to life-long learning paradigm.

See, generally, Special Issue: Empowering the Workforce, Defense Acquisition
(Early Release, March-April 2022), https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/p/
Defense-Acquisition-Magazine-Mar-Apr-2022; Vernon J. Edwards, DOD’s
Back-to-Basics Program: A Surrender?, 35 N&CR ¶ 18 (March 2021) (fretting
that: “The training was not all that good before Back-to-Basics; now it will
be cut by 75%.”); Vernon J. Edwards, Acquisition Education and Training:
A Scandal, 35 N&CR ¶ 6 (January 2021) (bemoaning “[t]he current state of
affairs, in which working-level [procurement professionals …] cannot access
readily usable and up-to-date editions of helpful textbooks and handbooks
… [as a] failure of acquisition leadership and management[, …] the skeletal
Federal Acquisition Institute and the nearly moribund [Defense Acquisition
University]”).
B. New Faces, But Not Enough of Them. Last year, with the start
of the new administration, it was too early to speculate as to who would assume significant leadership roles in the acquisition community under the
new administration. A year later, as the pace at which positions are being
filled remains modest, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions.
• Still Waiting at OFPP, OMB. In August, nominated Biniam Gebre
to serve as the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). It is
unclear what progress has been made since (and Gebre remains on the Accenture website). He previously served as Acting Assistant Secretary and
Commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration and as a partner with
McKinsey & Co. Of course, this may have to wait until the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is in place (but, of course, that is
pure speculation). Deputy Director Shalanda Young was nominated to serve
as Director in November, after Neera Tanden’s nomination was withdrawn.
Nani A. Coloretti was nominated to serve as Deputy Director. In addition,
OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) lacks a nominee,
and the Acting OIRA Administrator, Sharon Block, who previously served as
Associate Administrator, plans to leave soon. It is difficult to reconcile the lack
of progress on this nomination, given the pace of proposed and anticipated
regulatory reform we discussed above.
• Stability at GSA? Robin Carnahan, no stranger to this community,
having led the State and Local Government Practice at GSA’s 18F, currently
serves as the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA).
Among other things, she has focused on efforts to improve customer experience and government services for the American people. Statement by GSA
Administrator Carnahan on President Biden’s Executive Order on Improving Customer Experience and Government Services for the American People
(December 13, 2021), https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/
statement-by-gsa-administrator-carnahan-on-president-bidens-executiveorder-on-improving-customer-experience-and-government-services-for-theamerican-people-12132021. See also, Performance.gov, https://www.performance.gov/cx/, which explains that it is “a window into the performance of the
Federal Government[, with a …] mission is to make this information easy to
find and understand, so that you can follow what your government is doing
© 2022 Thomson Reuters
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about the issues essential to your family, community, or business.”
• Incremental Progress at DoD. In November, William LaPlante
was nominated to serve as Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment
(USD(A&S)). Currently at Draper Laboratory, and formerly at MITRE, he
also brings experience having served as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. In a setback to the acquisition innovation community, the administration’s initial nominee, Michael Brown,
who continues to serve as the Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU),
requested that his nomination be withdrawn in July. Gregory M. Kausner,
a career executive, is currently performing the duties of USD(A&S). Frank
Kendall, who formerly served as USD(ATL), under its prior organizational
alignment, and is frequently associated with DoD’s so-called Better Buying
Power (BBP) initiative and principles, currently serves as the Secretary of
the Air Force, but none of the Military Departments have a confirmed Service
Acquisition Executive.
C. What of The Great Resignation? More broadly, there’s every reason
to expect that the future will include a fair amount of handwringing when
it comes to government staffing. We’re now in third decade of the great outsourcing effort (best summarized by Paul Light’s The Government-Industrial
Complex: The True Size of the Federal Government, 1984-2018 (Oxford,
2019)), and, for many years, we’ve also anxiously watched and bemoaned the
greying (and increased retirement eligibility) of the government workforce.
At least in this context, we can’t say that we didn’t see “The Big Quit” or “The
Great Resignation” coming. See, e.g., Abby, Vesoluis, Why Literally Millions
of Americans Are Quitting Their Jobs, Time (October 13, 2021), https://time.
com/6106322/the-great-resignation-jobs/. One of the most penny-wise-andpound-foolish government-specific examples has been the understaffing at
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which “has fewer auditors than at any
time since World War II. Faced with resource constraints, it is no surprise
that the agency is not able to appropriately focus scrutiny on complex returns,
where noncompliance is greatest.” Timothy F. Geithner, Jacob J. Lew, Henry
M. Paulson Jr., Robert E. Rubin and Lawrence H. Summers, Guest Essay: We
Ran the Treasury Department. This Is How to Fix Tax Evasion, N.Y. Times
(June 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/opinion/politics/irs-taxevasion-geithner-lew-paulson-summers-rubin.html.
D. Out of Afghanistan. We have long bemoaned the U.S. government’s
breach of its promise to contractor personnel who supported our troops and
other missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, interpreters, without
whom the military could not achieve its mission, have consistently been
identified – due to their visibility working alongside military personnel –
and targeted. Although our formal engagement in Afghanistan ended on
September 11, 2021, much work remains to be done. See also, PSC, ISOA &
NDIA letter to Secretary Blinken, Secretary Austin, and Ambassador Power
(May 13, 2021) (requesting help in addressing the significant impacts of the
decision to withdraw on contracting partners who have supported our nation’s Afghanistan policy), https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/press-media/
psc-afghanistan-drawdown-letter-to-usg-officials-13may2021-signed.ashx;
PSC letter (July 21, 2021) ((addressing, among other things, the lack of official
information pertaining to Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs)), file:///C:/Users/
sscho/Downloads/PSC%20-%20Afghanistan%20Letter%20to%20USG%20
Officials.pdf. Moreover, we appreciate the rare reminders of the extent of
mission’s reliance on contracts. See, e.g., Mark Cancian, In Afghanistan,
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Contractors Were Unsung Heroes Of US Efforts, Breaking Defense (August
30, 2021), https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/in-afghanistan-contractorswere-unsung-heroes-of-us-efforts/
The truth is that military forces in Afghanistan (and elsewhere)
could not have operated without the services that contractors
performed. And contractors have performed: They supported the
troops during the long years of war in Afghanistan and stayed
on the job under fire right up to the final collapse. As the Middle
East wars wind down, the accomplishments and sacrifices of these
contractors deserve recognition.

See also, Congressional Research Service, R46879, U.S. Military Withdrawal
and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46879, CRS Surveys DOD, Contractor Withdrawal From Afghanistan, 63 GC ¶ 255; Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR-21-46-LL, What We Need to Learn:
Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction, www.sigar.mil/pdf/
lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf, SIGAR Surveys Two Decades Of Oversight, Sustainability Problems In Afghanistan, 63 GC ¶ 251; Congressional
Research Service R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels
in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2020, crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/
R44116; CRS Surveys Decrease In DOD Contractor Personnel In Afghanistan,
Iraq, 63 GC ¶ 61
IV. POTPOURRI, VARIOUS AND SUNDRY ITEMS
A. The JEDI Saga Ends, Or Does It? This chapter would seem incomplete without at least a passing reference to the long running saga of DoD’s
Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) cloud computing solicitation,
contract, conflicts of interest, litigation, and appeals. Following Up … Supreme
Court Denies Certiorari In JEDI Protest, 63 GC ¶ 305 (denying, without comment, Oracle Am., Inc. v. U.S., 975 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2020)); DOD Issues
JWCC Solicitation to Four Firms for JEDI Replacement, 63 GC ¶ 374(b) (adding Google and Oracle); DOD Cancels JEDI Cloud Procurement, Launches
JWCC, 63 GC ¶ 203 (discussing initial solicitation for a Joint Warfighter Cloud
Capability (JWCC), anticipating two indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity
(ID/IQ) contracts, one each to AWS and Microsoft). See also, Vernon J. Edwards, The Sad and Dangerous State of Our Acquisition System: A Ponderous
Competition Process And Workforce Problems, 35 N&CR ¶ 36 (June 2021) (“[R]
ules are not the only problem. Agencies have created a workforce that is not
ready for prime time. They demand agility from persons who have received
small and low-quality education and training. They demand innovation from
persons who have not been taught the fundamental concepts and principles
of their business….”). The trajectory appears to suggest the establishment
of a large-scale DoD multiple-award ID/IQ (or task order) regime for a broad
range of cloud computing services and capabilities that many advocated for
throughout the JEDI winner-take-all saga.
B. JEDI (Or Mandalorian) Spin-Offs? Without drifting too far afield,
we concede we are intrigued by Oracle’s acquisition of Cerner. Oracle Press
Release (December 20, 2021), https://www.oracle.com/news/announcement/
oracle-buys-cerner-2021-12-20/. The announcement of that acquisition came
in the same month that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) – which is
introducing and deploying the Cerner Millennium system in dozens of medical
centers – touted its plan to reimagine its approach and move forward with
its systemwide Electronic Health Record Modernization (EHRM) program.
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Meanwhile, while it is unlikely to achieve JEDI’s iconic status, the moving
target set by CIO-SP4 continues to fascinate and flummox. In January, the
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) National Institute of Health
Information Technology Acquisition and Assessment Center (NITAAC) issued
amendments 14 and 15 to the ongoing Chief Information Officer-Solutions
and Partners 4 (CIO-SP4) Government-Wide Acquisition Contract (GWAC)
solicitation. (The current version of the solicitation runs 175 pages, and, “[o]
fferors are strongly encouraged to review all the Amendments and corresponding documents in their entirety.”) Nonetheless, NITAAC “fully expect[s] and
intend[s that] CIO-SP4 will be awarded in a timely manner.” See, CIO-SP4
Updates, https://nitaac.nih.gov/gwacs/cio-sp4; See also, Computer World Services Corporation, B-419956.18 et al., (sustaining a protest that the request
for proposals (RFP) was unduly restrictive). Some of the prior protests had
been addressed with prior solicitation amendments. Revised proposals are
now due in February (again, apparently, only firms who submitted proposals
in August are eligible).
C. And… No doubt, by the time the Year in Review Conference actually
rolls around, we’ll have more items to share. We look forward to learning the
direction in which these and other issues emerge.
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